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Restructuring and reorienting socialist economies is an integral but also deeply problematic 
aspect of their post-socialist transformation.1 The full range of problems involved here emerges 
most clearly when one recognizes at the outset that economic activities themselves are always 
socially embedded and socially regulated and that they are also overdetermined by various geo-
political, socio-cultural, and other non-economic factors. There are no pure market economies 
nor could there be.2 This enables us to identify at least four major problem-complexes which 
affect economic restructuring in post-socialist conditions. First, any post-socialist transformation 
would involve not only structural disembedding of emergent market forces from their erstwhile 
state socialist straitjacket but also re-embedding them into an institutional framework which 
could help to regularize accumulation. Second, post-socialist economies must escape from one-
sided economic dependence on their inherited links to former Comecon economies and move 
towards closer integration in the world capitalist system. This process is complicated by the 
problems involved in managing the economic (and political) disintegration of the Soviet bloc (cf. 
Andreff 1993) as well as the uncertainties related to major changes occurring in capitalism 
independently of those provoked by the Soviet collapse.3 A third problem-complex is tied to the 
collapse of the bipolar security regime which emerged during the Cold War and the resulting 
need to build a post-socialist security order for Eurasia which recognizes various ‘spheres of 
interest’ and the legitimate security needs of the USA, West European states, and the successor 
states in the Soviet bloc (cf. Tökés 1991: 102-105). And, fourth, there are serious problems for 
any economic transformation rooted in the complex and controversial politics of post-socialist 
identity construction, nation-building, and state formation. 
It is impossible for this chapter to deal with all four sets of issues. Instead it focuses on the 
former Comecon (or CMEA) countries and reviews the relations between their attempts to move 
from state socialism to capitalism and proposals for regional economic blocs and strategies. This 
focus can be justified by the link between structural adjustment in post-socialist economies and 
the complex spatial organization of capitalist economic relations. The CMEA’s collapse has 
broken established regional linkages in the former Soviet bloc and opened new opportunities for 
strategies oriented to sub-national development and/or supra-national economic integration. It 
has also left a legacy of interdependencies which constrain and limit the chances of successful 
integration into new regional economic systems. Moreover, despite current fascination with 
‘globalization’ in the capitalist economy, most economic activities are still oriented to other 
spatial scales. This entails a complex, contradictory dialectic between globalization and 
regionalization, to which the newly emergent post-socialist market economies will have to adapt 
if they are not to decline further in the international hierarchy. In short, the forms and outcome of 
economic transformation will depend on the local and regional dimensions of the emerging post-
socialist economies themselves and on how different economic forces seek to become integrated 
into emerging post-socialist and/or capitalist regional blocs. 
This chapter first considers various discontinuities and continuities in Eastern and Central 
Europe which bear on its economic transformation. It then reviews major changes in the 
capitalist economy into which the post-socialist economies are trying to become integrated. 
Given the complex dialectic between internationalization and regionalization involved in these 
changes, I then examine the problematic status of ‘regions’, propose to interpret them as 
‘imagined’ economic spaces, and note some basic material differences between regions in post-
socialist and capitalist societies. The discursive character of ‘regions’ is further illustrated 
through a brief review of nine different types of supra-national regional economic strategy 
proposed for one or more post-socialist societies. Next I review sub-national strategies for 
regional cooperation and development in post-socialist economies. These general overviews of 
regional strategies are followed by some brief comments on specific countries but no attempt is 
made to give a comprehensive survey of developments in every post-socialist economy. The 
chapter ends with some general remarks on present trends and future prospects in regional 
economic strategies and developments within and beyond the post-socialist bloc. 
 
I. Discontinuities and Continuities in Eastern and Central Europe 
 
As reforms continue to evolve haltingly in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet 
Union, there are at least five major shifts occurring in post-socialist countries which bear on the 
issues of international competitiveness and regional economic strategies of concern here. 
First, the CMEA has disintegrated as a regional bloc organized under Soviet economic, 
political, and military domination. Comecon included members outside Europe and Central Asia 
(e.g., Cuba, Vietnam, Mongolia) and had some developing countries as cooperants. Nonetheless 
its chief role was to manage the bulk of trade and payments in the contiguous Eurasian Soviet 
bloc. From 40 to 80 per cent of the overall trade of individual members was cleared in the 
CMEA until 1989. Although some members had already begun to reorient their trade relations in 
the 1980s, Comecon as a whole began to collapse visibly, albeit gradually, from early 1990. It 
was formally disbanded on 28th June 1991 without agreement being reached on any successor 
organization or new trade and payment regimes. This self-dissolution did not (and could not) at 
once end the strong economic linkages which existed among CMEA members due to the overall 
division of labour imposed on all of them by the Soviet Union. This involved overemphasis on 
heavy industry in each of the socialist economies, regardless of local comparative advantage; 
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heavy dependence on the USSR for the supply of raw materials and energy and as a market for 
Comecon products; and diverse national specializations in producing certain goods for the whole 
of the CMEA market, regardless of local comparative advantage or saleability on the world 
market (Hare 1992: 228-229). 
Second, the former Soviet Union (subsequently renamed the Commonwealth of Independent 
States, referred to below as CIS) has also been disintegrating economically, politically, and 
socially. The three Baltic republics split off first in the wake of perestroika, moving from 
independent financial status to political independence as sovereign states. This prompted the 
‘Nine plus One’ agreement in April 1991, involving the governments of the remaining nine 
Soviet Republics and the Soviet President; its aims were to coordinate economic reforms and 
avoid fresh departures. It failed in both respects due to uneven economic development, 
unresolved political disputes, and the impact of the abortive Moscow coup against Gorbachov in 
August 1991; the Ukraine and Belarus were the next to opt for independent statehood, followed 
at close intervals by the five Central Asian republics.4 Disintegrative tendencies have been 
further aggravated by the re-emergence and/or re-articulation of national, regional, local, and 
ethnic identities within and across different republics. This is reflected in local autonomy 
movements and ethnic disputes in individual republics; religious, linguistic, ethnic and cultural 
conflicts in and across republics; and so forth.5 Such tensions reinforce the growing economic 
and political conflicts among different tiers of government in the various republics and are 
disrupting trade within the CIS itself and with its former CMEA partners. The latter also show 
signs of medium-term disintegration, with mounting ethnic or national tensions, unresolved 
border disputes,6 irredentist movements, and religious confrontation. If ethnic and border 
disputes pose the most serious medium-term threats, Islamic Fundamentalism is more 
threatening in the longer term (cf. Peterson 1992). 
Third, the post-socialist economies are re-orienting their activities to world markets and 
European economic space. This process is very uneven in its extent and success; but it has 
further disrupted previous links in the CMEA as economic mechanisms and regulatory regimes 
diverge. Poland and Hungary had already begun to reorient their trade towards Western Europe 
in the 1970s and 1980s; others have been following at different speeds and with different 
prospects (cf. Bakos 1993; and below). In all cases there is growing emphasis on structuring 
trade relations in terms of world market prices and on the need to export to western markets. 
Such shifts involve neglecting the former CMEA’s redistributive role and so tend to aggravate 
national and regional imbalances among its past members. Indeed, as Brabant notes, ‘countries 
that seek to gear their economy rapidly to market criteria encounter problems in dealing with 
partners who, by and large, still adhere to administered trade or whose economy is in 
fundamental disarray’ (1992: 23). 
Fourth, attempts are now well under way to move to marketized, competitive economies 
through the seeming paradox of active state sponsorship of a neo-liberal economic 
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transformation. The dynamic of capitalist economies is fundamentally determined by the 
fundamental mediating role of market forces, these forces will only function effectively if they 
are embedded in a much broader ensemble of social institutions. Thus the transition to capitalism 
entails both the liberation of market forces and their restriction. If the emerging market forces are 
not embedded in appropriate non-market relations, they will produce catastrophic disequilibrium 
and strengthen tendencies to systemic vacuum in Eastern Europe. 
Fifth, attempts have been initiated to develop more democratic forms of political 
organization, especially regarding multi-party elections and the restructuring of central-local 
relations. Unfortunately it is far from self-evident that market-oriented economic reform and 
democratization are wholly complementary. Ideally the state’s economic capacities would be 
reinforced by an institutionalized, democratic compromise on a viable post-socialist economic 
strategy; and the play of political forces within a democratic system would be aided by the 
material resources generated by this strategy. In reality, however, post-socialist societies are 
marked by acute structural crises, fiscal and financial crises, and social disintegration. Nor can 
one choose once-and-for-all to prioritize the struggle for economic regeneration or that for 
democratization. Instead oscillation is likely between economically and politically motivated 
responses in which neither a coherent economic strategy nor a stable political order is fully 
secured. In turn this risks a retreat into localized informal markets and/or reliance on primordial 
solidarities. 
At the same time there are major structural and strategic continuities. It is worth noting just 
four of these here and, although they are no less important for international competitiveness and 
regional economic strategies, they will be dealt with more briefly. First, despite the 
disintegration of the CMEA’s formal institutional and cooperative structures, the economic 
structures it involved have survived in individual member states together with their associated 
interdependences. Thus the ex-CMEA economies are generally marked by low levels of 
economic specialization and trade profiles oriented to the relatively closed CMEA model. The 
post-socialist economies are therefore proving to be significant competitors with each other (as 
well as with peripheral EC economies such as Greece or Portugal and with third-tier NICs) in 
world markets. Moreover, even where specialization developed, it derived from political 
coordination rather than market-based static or dynamic competitive advantages. In some cases a 
given sector’s output is too large to be absorbed on the home market and could not be dumped 
(let alone sold at cost) on the world market. In other cases ex-CMEA economies remain critically 
dependent on inputs from elsewhere in the old Soviet bloc. Second, the various post-socialist 
economies have generally inherited out-dated production structures, labour processes, and modes 
of social regulation. But they may also have inherited certain sources of flexibility which 
enabled the formal command economy to survive as long as it did despite its inherent 
contradictions and/or which at least helped individuals, families, networks, and communities to 
survive despite its inefficiency. These may prove useful in managing the transformation of post-
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socialist economies (on this see Hausner et al., 1993). Third, despite the collapse of the 
communist state, the political nomenklatura has survived in many post-communist societies. 
With varying success it has attempted to transform itself into an economic nomenklatura through 
its use of state and managerial resources during a period of primitive accumulation and/or into a 
democratic post-socialist political class. Finally, survival of primordial identities and informal 
networks as protective devices in a period of economic and political chaos has reinforced the 
fragmentation and privatism of political life. Not only does this affect the political stability of 
post-socialist societies; it also affects their economic transition. The specific ways in which these 
continuities and discontinuities work themselves out will vary from country to country, sector to 
sector, and conjuncture to conjuncture. 
 
II. The International Context of Post-Socialist Transformation 
 
The context in which this simultaneous liberation and restriction of market forces must occur is 
marked by considerable instability and restructuring in the capitalist world order and its 
constituent economies. This presents opportunities to post-socialist and capitalist societies alike. 
But the very instability and uncertainty linked with this restructuring also involves real dangers 
that the transformation of the post-socialist societies could be disrupted through economic and 
political influences from abroad as well as through a systemic vacuum at home. 
In this regard I suggest that: (a) the capitalist economy is currently in transition between two 
long waves of economic expansion - one associated with the postwar Atlantic Fordist dynamic, 
one with a post-Fordist growth dynamic; (b) there is much enhanced state intervention 
throughout the capitalist world as the search continues for appropriate industrial paradigms, 
macro-economic regimes, and modes of social regulation which might help to consolidate this 
transition; (c) this intervention is strongly shaped by increasing economic internationalization 
and, especially, its implications for the changing forms of competitiveness which shape the play 
of market forces; (d) part of this restructuring process is the search for ways to integrate the post-
socialist economies into the world economy so that accumulation in advanced capitalist 
economies can be promoted; and (e) this means that, independently of any enhanced economic 
role for post-socialist states associated with the general systemic vacuum and the specific 
economic crises they face, they will also be subject to indirect intervention from capitalist states 
to facilitate crisis-resolution on their own behalf. In short, we are living at a time when state 
economic functions are especially marked and wide-ranging in scope; and in this regard we must 
study the relation between post-socialist and capitalist states. 
All of these features of the current capitalist economic (dis)order have a major bearing on the 
post-socialist transformation and its regional aspects. The technological upheaval linked with the 
crisis of Fordism and the trial-and-error search for a new growth dynamic was one of the factors 
behind the crisis of the state socialist model.7 It still threatens the competitiveness of the out-
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dated technological bases of the post-socialist economies but may also facilitate a technological 
leap through their inclusion in international product cycles (so that they become production 
platforms for mature products for domestic or export markets) and/or through technology 
transfer thanks to foreign direct investment, strategic alliances with foreign transnationals, or 
foreign aid. In any event it is clearly changing the terms and conditions of international 
competitiveness. The changing role of capitalist states has been seriously mis-interpreted in their 
post-socialist equivalents. For the self-evident ‘rolling back’ of forms of state intervention 
associated with Fordism is also combined, even in self-professed ‘neo-liberal’ regimes, with the 
‘rolling forward’ of the capitalist state in new directions. At stake is the redrawing of the 
boundaries and forms of state intervention rather than the impossible resurgence of some 
mythical nightwatchman state. There is a real danger that capitalist neo-liberalism is taken at 
face value with the result that post-socialist states are simply dismantled rather than actively 
restructured (cf. Jessop 1991). The internationalization of the capitalist economy is especially 
significant for post-socialist economies since this presents a complex and contradictory set of 
opportunities as they re-orient themselves to the world market (see below). In this regard one 
should note that the forms of this integration will be singificantly determined by the strategies 
adopted towards the post-socialist societies by capitalist forces abroad and that these strategies 
are themselves complex and contradictory.  
For the moment I want to focus on the link between internationalization and regionalization. 
Despite the current fascination with ‘globalization’, internationalization rarely takes a global 
form. What is usually subsumed under the latter rubric is a complex, even contradictory, process. 
Thus it currently includes: (a) internationalization of national economic spaces through growing 
penetration (inward flows) and extraversion (outward flows); (b) the growth of ‘local 
internationalization’8 through economic ties between local and regional authorities in different 
national economies; (c) the extension and deepening of multinationalization as MNCs and TNBs 
move from limited economic activities abroad to more comprehensive and worldwide strategies, 
sometimes extending to ‘global localization’ in and through which corporations pursue a global 
strategy based on exploiting local differences; and (d) the emergence of globalization proper due 
to the introduction of global norms and standards, globally integrated markets, globally oriented 
strategies, and ‘deracinated’ firms with no evident national operational base (on the last process, 
see Petrella 1989, 1990). Rather than an homogenization of the world economy, these processes 
involve a reordering of differences and complementarities across national and local spaces as the 
basis for dynamic competitive advantages. This in turn offers opportunities for supra-national, 
national, and local states to shape these differences and complementarities and thereby influence 
their structural competitiveness.9 
In this context we are witnessing a revalorization of the regional level of economic activities 
and intervention and this has major implications for the global economic hierarchy. Indeed, the 
latter is now being redefined yet again, with increased emphasis on the role of three supra-
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national growth poles. These are based on the regional hegemonies of the USA, Japan, and 
Germany and reflected in attempts to create a North American Free Trade Area, a European 
Economic Space, and an Asian Pacific Economic Community. There is already a major material 
basis to these latter developments with the growing intensity of internal trade in each bloc (this is 
most marked in the European Community) and/or the deepening of the inter-regional division of 
labour in each bloc. But this trend also has a strong discursive dimension in so far as triad 
strategies have become more popular in various quarters. Celebration of ‘triad power’ in much 
recent work should not, however, blind us to three other important tendencies: (a) the growing 
interpenetration of the so-called triad powers themselves as they develop specific 
complementarities and form strategic alliances; (b) shifts in the national hierarchies within each 
triad due to uneven development; and (c) the re-emergence of regional economies within some 
national economies as part of the internationalization process and/or in reaction to it. These 
changes also have their own material and/or strategic bases and one should not regard 
regionalization as inherently supra- or sub-national in its dynamic. Instead there is a complex re-
articulation of global-regional-national-local economies with differential effects in different 
contexts (cf. Taylor 1991). 
As these complex and contradictory processes unfold, states must tackle the many domestic 
repercussions of global restructuring by getting involved in managing the process of 
internationalization itself. This in turn points to the need for alliance strategies among states on 
different regional scales to secure the basis for economic and political survival as the imperatives 
of structural competitiveness make themselves felt. These alliances will vary with the position of 
the economies concerned in the international hierarchy. Thus, whilst a small open economy 
(whether capitalist or post-socialist) might well seek closer integration with the dominant 
economic power in its immediate triadic growth pole, the dominant power itself might well seek 
not only selectively to bind neighbouring economies into its strategic economic orbit but also to 
enter alliances with other dominant triad powers. These alternatives are already emerging in 
post-socialist economies with Germany playing a key role in shaping alliances and forging new 
links among different transitional economies (see below). Exactly how such strategies develop 
cannot be determined at this level of analysis, however, depending as it does on the changing 
balance of forces and different modes of strategic calculation. But we can at least review 
alternative strategies and consider some of the general problems involved in their 
implementation. This is the task of the next three sections. 
 
III. What is a Region? 
 
Before dealing with supra- and sub-national regional strategies for economic and political 
transformation, we should ask what constitutes a region. Rather than seek an elusive objective 
economic criterion for defining a region,10 this paper treats the region as an emergent, socially 
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constituted phenomenon both in nation-states and in the relations among them. Bassin provides 
an interesting historical example in changing views about the geographical identity of Russia 
vis-à-vis Europe and Asia and their link to geo-political and cultural factors (Bassin 1991). In 
more contemporary vein, Neumann notes that the Nordic region ‘is constantly being defined and 
redefined by its members in a permanent discourse with each member attempting to identify 
itself at the core of the region. The core is defined in both territorial and functional terms and this 
definition necessarily involves a manipulation of knowledge and power’ (1993: 53). More 
generally, there is continuing debate about the validity of a divide between Central and Eastern 
Europe which might be rooted in historical and/or current divisions (for different positions in this 
debate, see Agh 1993; and Enyedi 1990a) or about the distinction between northern and southern 
republics in the Commonwealth of Independent States (Derluguian 1993). Discursive struggles 
are especially important during economic and political upheavals which create opportunities for 
new regional projects and programmes. Moreover, despite Neumann’s claim, it is not just 
potential members of a region who are engaged in defining it. Outside forces can also contribute 
to this by privileging certain discourses or promoting certain regional tendencies over others. 
This can be seen in the tendency for western powers to regard the Visegrad four as forming a 
Central European bloc distinct from Eastern Europe through their inclusion in the Gulf War 
alliance, special links with the EU, and similar forms of economic or political treatment (cf. 
Tökès 1991: 110). 
We must also recognize that regions can have multiple boundaries and will be distinguished 
(or ‘imagined’11 or simply ‘imaged’) in different discourses for different purposes and effects. In 
relation to economic strategies we can distinguish a complex and tangled hierarchy of regions. 
At the peak of the hierarchy we can discern two broad geo-strategic realms (the Maritime realm 
comprising Western Europe, North America, Maritime East Asia, Australia, and the 
Mediterranean littoral and the Eurasian Continental realm comprising in particular the former 
Soviet Union and China); next come subordinate geo-political regions (e.g., Europe, Japan, 
North America) and independent geo-political regions outside the two main geo-strategic realms 
(e.g., South Asia); below these we find individual national states; and, below these in turn, sub-
national economic regions and cross-border regions (cf. Cohen 1991). These various types of 
region are characterized by different and changing degrees of hegemony and hierarchy, 
overlapping spheres of influence, national components and transnational influences, 
interdependences and pockets of self-containment, embryonic and dying regions, marginal 
spheres and areas of confrontation. 
During the postwar period the world economy was structured around, inter alia, the bipolar 
confrontation between the USA and the Soviet Union as the world’s principal superpowers. 
Following the end of the second Cold War a space has opened for new forms of rivalry in 
Europe and the wider world: in particular there is an obvious and growing conflict between 
Russia, Germany, and the Anglo-American Atlantic alliance for influence within the post-
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socialist economies (cf. Neumann 1994). The decline of the Soviet Union as a global power has 
not, however, led Russia to abandon pretensions to international influence or spheres of interest, 
albeit on a more restricted scale. Thus, besides seeking continued influence (if necessary through 
armed conflict or economic resources) in the former Soviet Union, it is also trying to revive its 
influence in the Scandinavian region, the Balkans, and the Middle East. At the same time the re-
unification of Germany has shifted the latter’s economic centre of gravity eastwards, provided it 
with direct access to Poland and other ex-CMEA economies, and presented it with opportunities 
to develop a D-mark bloc partially located beyond the immediate framework of the European 
Union. Other national economies and states are also strongly interested in shaping the economic 
future of post-socialist societies and how they will be integrated into the new global economic 
hierarchy. 
Nonetheless it would be misleading simply to equate regions in capitalist and post-socialist 
economies. At least three distinguishing factors matter here: namely, the relationships between 
national territories and national identities, administrative and historical regions, and central 
planners and local bodies responsible for implementing their plans. First, in contrast to other 
post-socialist societies, the former USSR has inherited an allegedly unique combination of 
national territorialization (republics are identified with national groups) and the official 
ascription of national identity independent of birthplace or current residence. This has created 
the space for a wide spectrum of disputes among national minorities in different republics as well 
as inter-republican conflicts over the rights of so-called ‘nationals’ elsewhere in the CIS or 
former Comecon members. Second, as van Zon has emphasized, regions in centrally planned 
economies also differed in many respects from those in advanced capitalist economies. Their 
development was orchestrated from above through the industrial location decisions of ministries 
rather than emerging from below through market forces (Van Zon 1992); and administrative 
decisions in turn were typically made without regard to traditional local or regional 
considerations (cf., on agricultural policy-making and rural communities, Maurel 1990: 213-
215). However, third, despite the continuing attempts at top-down economic planning, the nature 
of the shortage economy meant that power was partially deconcentrated to production ministries 
and/or regional authorities. These assumed de facto responsibilities for pursuing priority goals 
and developed transregional and regional networks to compensate for shortages and other 
planning defects (cf. Sapir 1993: 8-10). 
Analogous differences existed among cities in socialist and capitalist societies, with the 
former affected by the absence of a market in land, state control over housing allocation and 
rents, a trend toward large housing estates, lower levels of suburbanization, limited new 
investment in and new uses for inner city areas - effectively freezing the appearance and uses of 
old inner city areas, lower levels of service employment, and a tendency to industrial 
deconcentration for regional and planning reasons (Musil 1993: 900-903; also Enyedi 1992: 
871). 
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Such regional and urban differences have important implications for the current development 
of regional and supra-national economic strategies in post-socialist societies. For East and 
Central Europe, Van Zon identifies these implications in the following terms: (a) the inherited 
administrative regions were weakly developed and local and regional authorities still have few 
formal competences to pursue local or regional economic strategies; (b) administrative regions 
typically do not coincide with historical regions; (c) during the socialist period, a certain de-
regionalization occurred, with few inter-sectoral links developing on the regional level due to the 
dominance of central allocative decisions in socialist shortage economies with the result that a 
sectoral or branch economy rather than a territorial economy emerged; (d) large enterprises had a 
key role in social life, including the provision of social infrastructure for regions, so that the 
crisis of the former often provokes a severe crisis in social policy; (e) regions are less diversified 
compared to those in capitalist societies; (f) there is a greater degree of uneven development 
between cities and larger towns and the countryside such that, whereas there were typically 
many medium-sized cities and large towns rather than one dominant capital city (Hungary is an 
exception due to territorial losses), border areas and remote or uplands regions were neglected 
and suffered depopulation and underdevelopment; and (g) the western halves of socialist 
economies were better developed than those in the east even though trade flows were directed 
eastwards12 (Van Zon 1992: 3, 16; on city size, see also Bachtler 1992: 665). 
Chumachenko likewise argues that the various republics of the old Soviet Union did not 
develop as independent economies based on market forces. Their pattern of production and inter-
republican trade, urbanization, and migration reflects years of rigid, centralized planning. 
Compared to East and Central Europe, however, a certain degree of inter-regional specialization 
developed. Thus some Central Asian republics could have specialized in agriculture; but they 
became cotton producers and imported food. Likewise Central Siberia now produces a large 
proportion of refrigerators and other household appliances for the CIS - even though its labour-
power is scarce and expensive. There are many other examples of this imposed division of 
labour. Thus, as the Soviet republics become independent in the emerging CIS framework, they 
will need to develop their own economic strategies to develop their comparative and/or 
competitive advantage within an emerging inter-republican and international division of labour 
(cf. Chumachenko 1993: 243-5). 
These different legacies can be seen to hinder an easy restructuring of economic relations - 
especially if one adopts an institutionalist approach which rejects the neo-liberal assumption that 
the liberation of market forces and entrepreneurial spirits would be sufficient to regenerate 
capitalism. Indeed these legacies have tended to stifle the role of regional authorities in re-
invigorating regional economies and organizing them for structural competitiveness as well as 
posing specific social problems. 
 
IV. Supra-national Regional Strategies 
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Having briefly reviewed the nature of regions and emphasized their historical constitution in and 
through social practices, we can turn to supra-national regional strategies for the East and 
Central European economies. Of interest here are the strategies oriented to re-situating them in 
the world economy. We can distinguish ten main alternatives in this context. These have all been 
seriously mooted at one time or another in one country or another but I am not claiming that they 
have all been advocated in all post-socialist economies nor that they are all equally viable or 
suitable for them all. Indeed, as I summarize the various options, it will become clear that they 
are by no means equally suited for a post-socialist transition. 
The first option is the whole-hearted adoption of free trade and unconditional integration as 
quickly as possible into the world economy. This is not so much a supra-national regional 
strategy as a policy based on belief in the beneficence of free trade and competition. It 
subordinates the post-socialist economy to the free play of market forces. Historically, advocacy 
of free trade is typically associated with economically dominant powers, that is, powers which 
have a lead in new technologies, a predominant role in production and trade, and control of a 
hegemonic or master currency. It is not usually advocated by those in weak economies, with 
relatively poor technological development, marginal roles in world output or trade, and weak 
currencies. In such cases free trade is more likely to generate declining economic coherence or 
disintegration of the economy and its subordination to external influences - whether through 
growing technological dependence, import penetration at the expense of local enterprise (with 
little chance to adjust structurally), or currency depreciation and inflation. Unsurprisingly this 
strategy was more often associated with western advisers than with local policy makers. 
Although it was nowhere pursued in all its free market purity, important elements of this neo-
liberal strategy can be found in several post-socialist economies. On more local scales, neo-
liberalism is also evident in proposals for free economic zones, open market enclaves, free trade 
zones,13 and so forth (on these see: Hamilton 1990: 156-7). 
Second, at the opposite end of the spectrum, there are various plans for protectionism, if not 
autarky. Such plans involve selective, if not complete, withdrawal from the world economy 
(including links with old CMEA partners) to develop a strong national economic base before 
being exposed to international competition or, in one Russian variant, before renewing an 
imperial project. This approach is sometimes linked to infant industry-style arguments and/or 
referred to the import substitution phase of several East Asian NICs’ growth trajectories before 
they turned to export-led development. It is also linked occasionally to geo-strategic and security 
considerations (again as in the South Korean or Taiwanese cases). Neo-imperialist autarky is 
most associated  proposals for a national salvation front committed to creating Greater Russia 
and with Zhirnovsky’s populist Russian nationalist project (cf. Kipp 1994; Harrison 1994). A 
full-blown autarkic strategy is improbable (even in cases such as Albania or North Korea, which 
lie beyond our remit) for four main reasons. First, most post-socialist economies lack the means 
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to be autarkic in the short-term; second, popular expectations are oriented to achieving western 
living standards as soon as possible; third, despite relatively low levels of specialization, there is 
a developed intra- and inter-sectoral division of labour inherited from the CMEA period and 
many post-socialist economies still depend on natural resources supplied by Russia; and, fourth, 
those economies in debt to the west would not be allowed to become autarkic at the expense of 
repayment schedules. Indeed leading international organizations and capitalist powers are 
pressing for apertura rather than closure. Not only is autarky impossible for economies such as 
Ukraine and Belarus; it would also be hard for relatively more self-sufficient economies. 
Moreover, whilst protectionism may prove viable as part of a medium-term restructuring 
strategy, provided it is accepted by major trading partners and international creditors, long-term 
protectionism is unlikely to generate the economic growth and social consumption that, rightly 
or wrongly, many people in post-socialist societies currently expect. 
Third, the most popular initial option was integration into the European economy, preferably 
as associate or full members of the European Union or, if not that, at least of the European Free 
Trade Association (EFTA). Experience with Greece (1981) and Spain and Portugal (1986) does 
suggest that the EU can cope with integrating poorer economies.14 But the export profiles of 
former Comecon economies is biased towards products considered ‘sensitive’ by the EU 
(including many products which would compete directly with those of Greece, Spain, and 
Portugal) so that tariffs on these products have been maintained in association agreements and 
early accession is unlikely. In addition, the financial costs of integrating the East and Central 
European economies would be even greater than those involved in the last enlargement and 
would be incurred at a time of increasing pressure on EU resources. If Sweden, Norway, Finland, 
and Austria also join, however, they may bring additional resources to help finance the costs of 
integrating the ECE economies. Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia applied for membership 
and were granted associate membership from December 1991.15 Albania and the Baltic states 
were granted most favoured nation status in May 1992. The Visegrad three also applied for 
EFTA membership but, given the likely accession of EFTA’s founding members to the EU in the 
near future, this can only be an interim measure.16 It is interesting to note here that over half of 
the total exports of Poland, Hungary, and the former Czechoslovakia in 1993 went to the EU (a 
50 per cent rise since the collapse of Comecon) and a further 15-20 per cent went to EFTA 
economies (Bakos 1993: 1029). How much further this growing de facto economic integration 
will go depends not only on the desires of economic forces in various post-socialist societies but 
also on the politics of the existing EU member states. Whereas some member states (most 
notably Britain) favour wider membership as a block on (political) deepening of the existing 
Union, others are more inclined to veto post-socialist membership or limit it to long-lasting 
associate status in order to ease the Union’s transformation into a political confederation. The 
most likely outcome is a growing, stepwise association with Europe, proceeding at different 
speeds for different countries. 
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In addition to its general agreement on associate membership as a prelude to eventual full 
membership, the EC has also been sensitive to the economic restructuring and strategic 
reorientation of the ECE countries. It promoted various programmes for economic assistance as 
the socialist economic bloc started to collapse. These include programmes to help specific 
economies (such as PHARE, first established in 1989),17 projects which aim to develop a 
network of cooperative links between regional and local authorities in the EC and Eastern 
Europe (such as Ouverture and the European Cities Cooperation System, or ECOS),18 projects to 
form and develop joint ventures among EC and ECE firms, schemes to transfer ‘know-how’ 
regarding the operation of market economies, and plans for cooperation in areas such as 
integrated energy markets or concerted response to environmental crises (see respectively the 
EC’s European Energy Charter and EC- and US-sponsored Regional Environmental Center for 
Eastern and Central Europe) (on Ouverture and ECOS, see Brown 1993; and European 
Commission 1994: 70-1). The OECD also established a Centre for Cooperation with European 
Economies in Transition in March 1990 and EFTA member states signed cooperation 
agreements with Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania in late 1991. In 
addition, individual EU member states, local authorities, non-governmental organizations, and 
other agencies (including private sector consultancies) are getting involved in similar projects on 
diverse scales for various goals. 
Fourth, building on the experience of European economic integration in the EC and EFTA, 
there are plans for a wider European common market. Although this would be wider than the 
European Union, it would also be ‘shallower’. Essentially the proposals are for a common 
market of some kind. For example, whilst at the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, Jacques Atali argued for a Continental Common Market, expanding the EC’s 
market structure to all of Europe. Equally ambitious proposals include a ‘New Europe from the 
Atlantic to the Urals’ or a ‘free trade zone which spans Continental Europe’ (on these and other 
plans, see Andreff 1993).  
Fifth, given the continued legacy of economic interdependence, there are proposals for the 
partial resurrection of the Comecon as a multilateral macro-economic organization (cf. Smyslov 
1992; Andreff 1993). Besides instituting the exchange of information, consultation over common 
interests, and so on, this could also take the form of a Customs Union with common external 
customs regulations and/or a Central European Payments Union which would clear trade 
imbalances on a bilateral or multilateral basis, with the means of payment pegged (according to 
some proposals) to the Deutschemark or the ECU (Bakos 1993: 1029-30). The payments union 
would not revive the forms of a common market with community-wide decision-making 
institutions and common modes of social and economic regulation. This stands more chance of 
success if it is restricted to the Central European economies (Poland, Hungary, the Czech lands, 
Slovakia); but, in the reckoning of some, if the CIS states joined, it might pose problems of 
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stability. In any event, given current preferences for alternative regional economic strategies, a 
payments union is only likely as part of a more complex development linked to other strategies. 
Sixth, rather than recreating the CMEA in post-socialist conditions, there are proposals for 
local economic integration among subsets of the former post-socialist economies. The most 
important case (and one strongly supported by western capitalist forces) involves the Visegrad 
grouping of Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. It initially involved regional cooperation, 
agreed in the Visegrad Treaty (February 1991), over democratic transformation following the 
dissolution of the Warsaw Treaty Organization. A subsequent agreement, signed in December 
1992, established the Central European Free Trade Association (CEFTA). The founding 
document emphasized the role of trilateral cooperation in “(a) security policies and relations with 
European institutions; (b) transport, highway infrastructure and telecommunications; (c) sub-
regional and micro-regional projects; (d) enterprise-to-enterprise cooperation; (e) cooperation 
among the private sectors in tourism and retail trade; (f) cultural, education and youth exchange; 
and (g) the establishment of bilateral foundatons to promote cultural, historical and scientific 
cooperation” (cited in Bakos 1993: 1030-1031; to this list, Tökés adds human rights, local 
government and sub-regional contacts, and ecological cooperation, 1991: 111). CEFTA has 
some potential as an economic association not only because of its growing trade with the EU but 
also because of  complementarities among the three (now four) economies themselves. These 
include intra-sectoral trade specialization dating from the 1980s, especially in semi-finished 
goods, Hungary’s labour surplus and the Czech lands’ labour shortage, and the potential for 
exchanging Polish energy and raw materials for Hungarian food and manufactures. CEFTA 
members decided against admitting the Ukraine in February 1992 because, while they favour 
NATO, the Ukraine has opted for neutrality.  
Seventh, there are international proposals for regional cooperation between post-socialist and 
capitalist economies to create new economic formations. Among these proposals and projects are 
the following: 
a) the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Project was established in 1992 on the initiative of 
Turkey and its signatories included: Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, Moldova, Russia, Georgia, 
Azerbaijan, Armenia, Turkey, and Greece. Among the areas for cooperation are: the 
environment, transport, communications, trade and investment banking, energy, 
information, mining, science, technology, tourism, agriculture, health, and free trade zones 
(Bakos 1993: 1034: Gençkaya 1993). The post-socialist partners have been especially 
interested in deepening these links to consolidate their sovereignty and security; Italy was 
interested in countering increasing German influence in the region; Turkey hoped to expand 
its trading links northwards given that its producer services and consumer products are less 
competitive in the advanced capitalist economies and its long-awaited EU membership had 
been blocked; it also wanted to further its regional power status by adding hegemony in the 
BSECP to its growing influence to the west through Balkan cooperation and to the east via 
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the Economic Cooperation Organization (see below).19 Were the Project to be realized, it 
would help to consolidate a north-south axis across Europe stretching from the Baltic to the 
Adriatic and Black Seas. This could link Silesia, Moravia, Hungary, and Croatia to the 
member states in a continuous industrial belt (Bakos 1993: 1035) and would help to 
counteract the west-east axis from the Benelux countries through Germany and Poland to 
the Baltic republics, Belarus, the Ukraine, and Russia.  
b) the Economic Cooperation Organization (Izmir treaty) in Central Asia. This was founded 
by Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan in the late 1980s and was extended to include Afghanistan and 
six Muslim republics of the CIS in November 1992. Romania also seems interested in 
joining. There is some disagreement on its future development with Turkey seeing it as akin 
to the European Union and Iran as an ‘Islamic Commonwealth’; at least two of the Muslim 
republics are also unstable. The region has potential in terms of ecological cooperation, 
control over informal or illegal cross-border trade, a common market for small and medium 
manufacturers, integration of energy supplies and trade, and trade routes (cf. Gharabaghi 
1994). In addition, plans for a Central Asian Common Market were announced in January 
1993. Here too the most engaged regional actors are Turkey and Iran together with the 
Moslem republics, with Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Egypt, and Israel also showing interest (cf. 
Gharabaghi 1994: 115).  
c) the ‘Japan Sea’ Rim Economic Zone. This proposal is intended to build on a history of 
regional exchanges, growing economic ties between South Korea and the former Soviet 
Union, between South Korea and China, and the potential for Russo-Japanese exchanges. If 
developed it would be based on on the complementary strengths of different partners (e.g., 
raw materials and marine products in Sibera and Far Eastern provinces, the agricultural and 
light industrial products of northeastern China, labour-power in China and North Korea, 
consumer goods from South Korea, and the capital and technology of South Korea and 
Japan (Kanamori 1990; European Commission 1992: 43; Kwan 1994: 130-2; Nester 1993: 
717). Such a scheme is still far from realization, however, in part because of the Russo-
Japanese dispute on sovereignty over the Kirile islands, uncertainty about Russia’s future 
political stability, and Japanese wishes not to become overdependent upon Russian raw 
materials and energy (cf. Nester 1993: 729).20 
d) Baltic cooperation. There are several proposals to further economic cooperation in the 
Baltic. One interesting example is the Nordic Baltic Investment Programme designed to last 
three years in the first instance and to cover five different areas of cooperation: technical 
assistance to investment banks, joint Nordic-Baltic projects, privatization, investment fund, 
and risk capital (Abbott 1993: 230-1). A Baltic Council was formed in March 1992, 
comprising 10 states including Russia. 
e) Project Bridge. Proposed by Branko Horvát, this was to comprise a new common market 
and monetary union embracing post-socialist and capitalist countries from the Baltic to the 
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Black Sea and Mediterranean which form a bridge between the EC and the Soviet Union 
(Horvát 1992).  
Eighth, there are analogous plans to revive actual or proposed politico-economic links from 
the past. Today these would typically involve one or more post-socialist states forming ties to a 
neighbouring state which had remained capitalist. Thus we can find plans for a Danubian 
Confederation, an idea that dates back to the late eighteenth century and was periodically 
resurrected; in its present form it would comprise Austria, Hungary, Romania, Croatia, and the 
southern Slavic provinces (cf. Bakos 1993; on interwar plans for Czech or Austrian-dominated 
Danubian Federations, see also Arter 1993: 66-70). There are also schemes for Bulgaria to enter 
into an alliance with Turkey as part of a revival of the Ottomon empire. And, of course, the 
emergence of a Baltic economic community is reminiscent of interwar plans for a Baltic 
Federation or of the even earlier Hanseatic League. 
Ninth, various cross-border regional partnerships have been proposed to link more than two 
sub-national economies into new regional entities in the hope of deepening existing 
complementarities. The most developed example of such partnerships consists in the Central 
European Initiative (formerly the Pentagonale). This started in 1978 as the Alpe-Adria 
‘Euroregion’ (comprising Italy, Hungary, Austria, and what was then Yugoslavia) with shared 
regional concerns (economic, social, ecological). It became the Pentagonale in April 1990 with 
the inclusion of Czechoslovakia; the Hexagonale when Poland joined in 1991; the Septagonale 
when Slovenia joined; and the Central European Initiative when Croatia joined. It was concerned 
to promote micro-regional cooperation between the bordering provinces of the signatories in 
such fields as transport, telecommunications, energy, small and medium enterprises, migration, 
scientific and technical research, tourism and culture, and so on. The strength of this grouping is 
related to the common heritage of its first members (due to their inclusion in the Venetian 
Maritime Republic and/or the Austro-Hungarian Empire), the importance for their growth 
dynamic of small and medium enterprises and flexible industrial districts (especially in 
mechanical engineering and textiles), and good connections between the major cities (Cappellin 
1992: 10). Its further potential is signified by the facts that Bulgaria and Romania have asked to 
participate in CEI projects; Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg have shown interest in some of the 
projects; and Sweden has been an observer at some meetings (Bakos 1993: 1033-34; Bowers 
1992: 7). 
The EC is involved in promoting a number of similar proposals for cross-border regional 
cooperation where a member state shares borders with post-socialist countries. This is seen to 
complement national level cooperation and to address specifically issues of disparities in frontier 
regions (cf. European Commission 1994: 62). In addition to the Alpe-Adria Euroregion, one 
could mention here: Interreg Greece, with borders to Albania, Bulgaria, and Macedonia as well 
as Turkey; Interreg Italy-Slovenia; four Euroregions involving Germany and its Eastern 
European neighbours;21 and the Danish island of Bornholm and the Baltic states. Beyond the 
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European Union, another example is the January 1992 agreement on cross-frontier cooperation 
in the economic and cultural fields in the ‘Carpathians-Tisza’ group, comprising Hungary, the 
Ukraine, and Slovakia (Bowers 1992: 7). Likewise there are plans for increased trade and 
specialization on the Russo-Chinese border in the context of the collapse of more centralized 
control in both Russia and China (cf. Pleskovic 1993: 300). Among other proposals in this 
context is that for the Mutankiang delta, involving Siberia and the Far Eastern republics of the 
CIS, provinces in north-eastern China, and North Korea, with Japanese backing (cf. European 
Commission 1992). Such strategies raise the danger of ‘cherry-picking’, i.e., of the selective 
integration of the western regions of Eastern and Central European economies into cross-border 
economic units at the expense of the overall economic and structural coherence of post-socialist 
economies.  
Tenth, as already hinted above, some proposals exist for linkages to East Asia as a source of 
FDI and trade and/or to exploit complementarities between capitalist and post-socialist 
economies. This applies particularly to the potential of linkages based on counter-trade between 
a resource-rich, capital-poor Russia and a resource-poor, capital-rich Japan. In exchange for raw 
materials, food, and investment opportunities, Japan would provide Russia with machine tools 
and capital goods for industrial restructuring and transfer the production of mature products (just 
as it has done elsewhere in the emerging North East Asian economic region). Intensifying 
Russo-Japanese trade would help to free Japan from dependency on the US market in a period 
when neo-mercantilism and the North American Free Trade Agreement could well restrict 
further growth opportunities there. The development of this ‘Northern option’ would seem to be 
politically acceptable to the dominant Liberal Democratic forces in the Japanese state as well as 
economically profitable for Japanese capital (cf. Leaver 1989). There are also certain 
complementarities between the first-tier East Asian NICs (such as Taiwan and South Korea) and 
the needs of Hungary and the Czech lands. Indeed, there was already some early inward 
investment from Korea and Taiwan in the 1980s. This was intended to exploit local markets and 
to secure an indirect route into European Community markets as well as to gain a march on 
Japanese capital, which is already seen as having captured the best markets in western Europe 
(cf. on Korea, Abdoolcarim 1993). It is also interesting to note that East Asian NIC investment 
in the former Soviet bloc is currently greater than that of Japan, due mainly to Japanese worries 
about political stability (European Commission 1992: 20, 110). Nonetheless it must be noted that 
the amount of East Asian investment in the post-socialist economies is still limited and is far 
outweighed by German and US investment (see below). 
 
V - Sub-national Regional Strategies 
 
So far we have considered various regional economic strategies which involve some form of 
economic integration or cooperation extending beyond the borders of individual post-socialist 
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economies. Current internationalization trends in capitalist economies are also associated with 
the resurgence of regional economies and renewed interest in local and regional economic 
development and the role of local and regional authorities in its promotion. Comparable trends 
can be discerned in the post-socialist economies. But the reasons for this are somewhat different.  
In particular, the rise of local or regional economies can be seen as a response to: (a) the 
protracted crisis in the shortage-inducing central planning system and the problems of macro-
economic management in economies in transition - a crisis which had already prompted 
decentralization and relocalization measures in some East-Central European economies in the 
1980s;22 (b) the collapse of economic relations stretching over extended areas due to 
deterioration and disruption of the transport and communications infrastructure, crises in money 
and credit relations regarding domestic as well as international trade; (c) pressures to deal with 
massive problems of economic restructuring and/or environmental damage in areas which were 
dependent on one or two industrial sectors - especially where these are no longer viable in 
marketized conditions; (d) the problems generated by the crisis of a system which had at least a 
nominal23 commitment to regional redistribution with the result that the intensification of 
tendencies towards uneven regional development consequent upon marketization are not 
matched by corresponding central governmental reaction;24 (e) a reaction against the 
centralization of decision-making in the former command economy which leads to local 
governments being established in even the smallest communities;25 and (f) the search of local 
officials for political support and legitimacy leads them in turn to protect local economic 
interests against the centre and other regions. In some cases these trends are transforming 
inherited patterns of regional differentiation into a form of economic segmentation marked by 
autarkic tendencies (cf., on Russia, Sapir 1993: 11). These largely economic problems have been 
further aggravated by ethnic, national, and religious national tensions in many post-socialist 
societies as well as by the population movements associated with ecological disasters, socio-
economic disintegration, and threats of limited civil war in the CIS.26 
In this context republican, provincial, and local level authorities have tended to replace 
enterprises as basic economic units. As the latter have become increasingly marketized and 
abandon extra-economic activities (such as social provision), pressure on local states to intervene 
has increased (cf. Artobolevskiy 1993). Their willingness and capacity to respond are assisted by 
a tradition of regional or local cooperation among party secretaries in assisting local enterprises 
to obtain supplies in a shortage economy (see, on the Soviet case, Kaser 1990: 597). In the 
former Soviet Union, for example, the local state appropriates a major proportion of key 
commodities (fuel, raw material, foods, consumer goods) to maintain regional commodity 
inventories; and uses these in inter-governmental barter trade to provide their respective local 
communities with non-local products. This trend is reinforced by the relative weakness of a 
market infrastructure (including wholesalers, distributors, etc.) and enterprise distrust of the 
ruble as a medium of exchange (cf. Pchelintsev 1993: 276; Prokop 1994).  
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The development of regional economic strategies cannot proceed, however, without some 
basic restructuring of the state apparatus and its capacities to project state power. Moreover, 
given the inherited crisis of state socialism, this restructuring must be one oriented to developing 
regional governance rather than regional government (cf. Schnieper 1993: 260; Popov 1993: 
284). In other words, what is needed are forms of public-private partnerships and regional 
networks which can be mobilized to solve specific economic, social, and ecological problems 
taking account of local potential. In addition they should develop local fiscal capacities, 
especially as the centre lacks resources to help the regions (Popov 1993: 282). This would 
contrast sharply with the top-down administrative structures typical of the former political order, 
in which ministries were more concerned with industrial than regional interests and local and 
regional enterprises were accountable to the centre rather than to local authorities (Shnieper 
1993: 258). In short, regional economic restructuring must be premised on restructuring of the 
local state. 
Finally we should note that explicit regional policy (as opposed to those de facto 
developments leading to greater regionalization or localization of economic spaces) has not 
received high priority in post-socialist economies. Indeed Artobolevsky and Treivish claim that 
‘regional policy ... is still absent in Eastern Europe. In particular, despite recognition of crisis 
phenomena - including regions formerly regarded as highly developed - not a single East 
European coutrny (unlike Western countries) has created a broad programme of measures for 
protecting problem areas. This applies all the more to supra-national policy within the 
framework of the whole of the former CMEA’ (1993: 54). In part this absence of explicit 
regional policy reflects the primacy of macro-economic transformation and the belief that 
regional problems would be solved through free market forces. In part it reflects uncertainty in 
identifying the regional disparities which might form the basis of a coherent regional policy 
during a period of rapid change. This is compounded by the ongoing reform of territorial 
structures and the relations between central, regional, and local government structures; in this 
sense, ongoing political processes of regionalization mean that state capacities to pursue regional 
economic policy are limited and insecure. A fourth problem is the limited experience with 
decentralized regional economic policy in a planned economy oriented to sectoral planning. The 
overall result has been greater concern to promote (potentially) strong growth regional poles 
with the best prospects of leading the national recovery and restructuring process rather than to 
address problems of regional disparities or uneven development - except in the form of 
emergency aid to relieve mass unemployment or ecological disaster areas (this paragraph draws 
on Bachtler 1992: 670-2). 
 
VI. Remarks on Individual Cases 
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It is impossible within the ambit of this chapter to comment extensively on all the countries 
involved in the transition. Accordingly I will focus on some representative cases. 
The three Baltic states of Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia lie on the central north-south and 
west-east axes of the new Europe. At the westernmost point of Russia and on the northwest 
borders of Belarus, they provide a crucial gateway to the CIS. All three are involved to differnet 
degrees in active economic restructuring and strategic reorientation around an emergent Baltic 
economic region. Estonia is the most advanced of these economies. Its trade is still strongly 
oriented to former Soviet bloc economies (especially Russia) but there has been some 
diversification (fuel supplies now come from Scandinavia rather than Russia) and trade in 
resources, textiles, light industrial goods, etc., is being re-directed to the west. Finland is the 
biggest source of foreign direct investment with Sweden also playing a major role among 
capitalist economies. Latvia is also exploiting its new economic independence to resume its 
traditional role as a trading nation. In certain respects its infrastructure is superior to Estonia’s 
and it has some high tech heavy and light industry (especially in electronics and electrical goods 
as well as textiles, household chemicals, and machinery) which are attracting western trading 
partners and joint ventures. Both the Estonian and Latvian economies are drawing strong interest 
from Scandinavian economies as well as from various European Community programmes. 
Infrastructural improvements and foreign investment suggest that the embryonic Baltic economic 
community will expand. In contrast Lithuania has rather limited agricultural and industrial 
potential. Its trade is still strongly oriented to the CIS (mainly agricultural goods exchanged for 
energy supplies) and Klaipeda is a major port for Russian oil exports. Nonetheless trade is being 
steadily integrated into the new Baltic regional economic bloc. 
 Belarus still faces difficulties because 70 per cent of its manufacturing output was delivered 
to other republics in the former Soviet Union, a higher proportion than for any of the other 14 
successor states. It has been hard hit by price liberalization in the other republics and the 
breakdown of the old centrally planned distribution system. The republic has joined the IMF, the 
World Bank, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. In the wake of 
independence a number of strategies were proposed. Among these were: a mercantilist search for 
economic autarky based on a national-democratic agricultural-industrial growth strategy and 
long-term tariffs; a Slavic economic model (based on renewed triangular cooperation among 
Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine and parallel reform strategies in each economy); a Baltic Union 
with the three new Baltic states based on a customs and currency union; reorientation westwards, 
thereby serving as a bridge between western Europe and the former Soviet bloc, based on 
growing cooperation with Germany, Italy, France, Poland, and other East European economies; 
and acting as a platform for a joint attack on European markets, drawing on local high tech and 
skills and East Asian capital. The principal problem with all of these strategies is the heavy 
dependence of Belarus on Soviet energy supplies and raw materials; the Slavic variant also 
depends on an improbable convergence between the economic and political reform processes in 
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all three economies. There is some polarization around these strategies with the Belarus national 
front inclined towards autarky or a western orientation, the old nomenklatura and communist 
forces inclined towards the slavic model (cf. Zaiko 1993). 
As in most former CMEA economies, Bulgaria overreacted against the idea of maintaining 
old trade links, especially with the ex-Soviet Union. In practice such trade remained important; 
and it is now being encouraged once again with new trade and clearing arrangements. As a 
symbol of economic re-orientation, however, Bulgaria signed an association agreement with the 
European Community (in March 1993) as well as a multilateral free trade agreement with EFTA. 
In addition there are attempts to revive the trade in goods and services which developed in the 
early 1980s with developing countries (especially in the Middle East) on the basis of bilateral 
agreements and concessionary finance. The continuing civil war in the former Yugoslavia, 
varying sympathies with the belligerents in other Balkan countries, and the impact of trade 
sanctions  on Serbia and Montenegro and Danubian river traffic have meant that Balkan regional 
cooperation has not yet extended much beyond traditional bilateral foreign trade relations. The 
Bulgarian government established five free trade zones to promote regional economic 
development in Bulgaria itself and has also considered extending the scheme to eleven border 
regions (cf. Jackimova 1993). We should also recall that Bulgaria is involved in various regional 
cooperation schemes such as the Turkish project for a Black Sea Economic Community. It may 
well fall under Turkish economic hegemony (see below). 
Czechoslovakia has split into the Czech lands (Bohemia and Moravia) and Slovakia. This 
reflects differences in the economic as well as political and cultural history of the Czech and 
Slovak regions. Czech industry was much more advanced in 1918 and stayed ahead of Slovakian 
industry in the interwar period; under the Communist regime, however, active regional policy 
and planning enabled Slovakia to catch up so that, by the end of the 1970s, the gap had nearly 
disappeared (cf. Capek and Sazama 1993: 211-214). Following the collapse of the communist 
regime, major disputes occurred over the pace of economic reform. Slovakia’s economic profile 
and location made it more dependent on links to the CIS (especially due to its military-industrial 
complex, its energy-intensive production, and its export markets) and this favoured a slower rate 
of change. It still has less autonomy in production than the Czech lands, still depends more 
heavily on imports from the former Comecon economies and the west, and is more reliant on 
export markets in the former Soviet bloc (including the Czech lands). Conversely, Czech 
industry felt more confident about marketization and the scope for a westwards reorientation. It 
also has a more flexible and potentially competitive industrial base. This is reflected in the fact 
that, after Hungary, the Czech lands have attracted the largest amount of foreign direct 
investment from capitalist economies. Notwithstanding the formal political separation, emerging 
collaboration in the framework of the Visegrad Treaty, increasing integration into a virtual 
Deutschemark bloc, and associate membership in the European Union are leading some Czech 
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and Slovak economists and politicians to consider some form of economic harmonization along 
Benelux lines (Capek and Sazama 1993: 229). 
 Hungary enjoys a favourable location in the new Europe and has attracted extensive foreign 
investment as well as being active encouraged to re-orient its activities to capitalist markets. As 
with other post-socialist economies attractive to foreign capital, however, this FDI is often 
associated with an interest on the part of western investors or partners to maintain trade with 
former Comecon partners. Hungary has been relatively successful in trade re-orientation and is 
already an associate member of the European Community. Its tendential integration into a series 
of new supranational alliances and cross-border links is already quite evident, although there are 
some fears about Hungarian irredentism in neighbouring states. Hungary had an active regional 
policy aimed at regional convergence during the communist period and this has been retained by 
the new Ministry for Environmental Protection and Regional Policy (Sillince 1987; Hare 1992). 
Although Poland experienced a severe adjustment shock from the neo-liberal Balcerowicz 
programme, the impact of recession in the Soviet Union, and the loss of markets in the former 
East Germany, four years of experimentation with economic stabilization policy have started to 
show dividends in terms of trade reorientation, export growth, currency stabilization and 
convertibility, and integration into a European regional economic bloc. As a pioneer in political 
as well as economic reform, Poland attracted foreign official lending, especially from the World 
Bank, to modernize its economic infrastructure. Equally Poland looked to the western powers to 
help consolidate its reforms against a potential Soviet backlash. Regional development has been 
emphasized both in the economic advice and financial support of foreign experts and authorities 
and by regions and cities in Poland itself. This is exemplified in the proposed development of 
Gdansk, Gdynia, Sopot as a major regional hub or gateway into Europe since the region occupies 
a key position on two international trade routes - north-south axis from Nordic countries to 
central and southern Europe and the east-west corridor which links European Union economies 
to the Baltic states, Belarus, and Russia. There are many other proposals both from abroad and 
within Poland itself for the development of regional or city economies, often in alliance with 
foreign capital and/or partner regions or cities beyond Poland’s borders. This is especially clear 
in regions which border the unified Germany and the Czech lands. In this respect one can discern 
the gradual re-emergence of historic regions and cities from the administrative straitjacket 
imposed by the command economy. Although van Zon suggested that regional policy was low 
on Poland’s policy agenda due to the economic crisis and the neo-liberal expectation that regions 
will find their own level (van Zon 1992: 34), there are now growing signs of interest in regional 
economic development and local states and city authorities are active in the field (cf. Stokes 
1993: 694). Even so proposals often refer to non-profit regional development bodies - 
necessitated, it is claimed, by the fact that, while firms are too profit-oriented, the state 
apparatuses are pre-occupied with privatization, commercialization, and the structural 
adjustment of apparatuses themselves (Kidyba and Lobocki 1993). In this context one finds the 
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usual package of proposals involving the promotion of small and medium enterprises, regional 
innovation, technology transfer, the mobilization of local capital, the need for vocational training 
and retraining, the importance of an overall regional development strategy, etc. (cf. Kidyba and 
Lobocki 1993). 
 Russia was the largest economy by far in the former Soviet Union. It has a total population of 
148 million and was responsible for 61.1 per cent of the net output of the USSR in 1988; second 
rank was taken by the Ukraine with some 51.8m people and 18.2 per cent of net output; and 
Belarus, despite having only 10.3m people, managed to produce 4.2 per cent of net output27 (cf. 
Duignan and Gann 1993: 181). The largest part of its population, its industrial output, its high 
tech, and its R&D was found in the provinces to the west of the Urals and there is still 
considerable economic potential in this region. Nonetheless Russia has been particularly affected 
by the disintegration of the Soviet Union and, besides the disruption caused to economic ties by 
the declaration of independence by the other Soviet republics, it has also experienced extensive 
fragmentation at provincial, regional, and local level. In certain key respects there has been a 
reversion to barter trade between regions - a phenomenon which gives regional and local 
authorities a potentially important broker role in the restructuring of regional economic relations 
as well as encouraging a short-term trend towards local empire building and the search for 
economic self-sufficiency. The overall effect of this has been to promote a series of disparate 
local or regional economic strategies in response to the overall crisis of economic integration and 
to provide opportunities for foreign capital and western powers to selectively integrate regions 
into the global economy. Thus the western provinces are being drawn into the Baltic economic 
region; Moscow and its immediate environs are clearly attractive because of the central political 
and economic significance of the region; Siberia offers enormous opportunities for a resource-
based economic expansion based on foreign investment. To date Russia has received less FDI 
than Hungary, the Czech lands, or Poland, however, owing to fears about its political stability. 
Even Russian expectations of official aid linked to such issues as decommissioning nuclear 
weapons, ecological relief work, progress towards democratization, and financial and 
commercial reforms have been significantly disappointed. In this context we are likely to see a 
more fragmented response to regional economic strategies and a more selective integration of 
regions and sectors into the world economy. Special economic zones have been proposed and 
these are strongest in Sibera and Far East (European Commission 1992: 60f). 
 Ukraine gained political independence in the wake of the Moscow coup in 1991 but lacked 
any immediate basis for economic development independent of Russia and other former 
Comecon states. It joined the CIS as the easiest way of exiting from the old Soviet Union.28 But 
weak political leadership, an ineffective state apparatus, and a paralysis prompted by worries 
about the reactions of the large Russian minority in the more industrialized parts of Ukraine, 
have meant that Ukraine has signally failed to gain any real measure of economic independence 
or to pursue any effective economic reforms. It has not developed the necessary institutional and 
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organizational apparatus of a relatively independent economy nor has it effectively addressed the 
legacy of the predominant role of military-industrial and heavy industrial enterprises oriented to 
the Comecon division of labour. Meeting international competitive conditions in these sectors or 
converting them to consumer goods production has proved almost impossible. Unsurprisingly 
the economy is still in severe financial and economic crisis. This explains the second thoughts 
about the break with Russia (as also in Belarus), the renewed popularity of the ex-Communist 
party, and growing recognition that ‘markets are markets, wherever they might be in the world’ 
(cf. Minossian 1994: 346, writing on Bulgaria). Nonetheless there are some signs of limited 
regional reorientation of trade (especially through barter trade with other former Comecon 
members) and regional development associations are beginning to emerge in areas such as the 
Donbas region (cf., on the latter, Popov 1993: 286-8).  
 
VII. Concluding Remarks on Current Trends 
 
Having reviewed the context of regional economic strategies, we can now draw some provisional 
conclusions. First, we should note that the formulation and implementation of such strategies has 
not received a high priority in post-socialist transformation. Other changes have taken 
precedence and, indeed, in certain respects should have done so for transformation to be 
effective. The second point to note is, perhaps, equally obvious and important: that the 
transformation process is clearly and inevitably overdetermined by extra-economic constraints 
and forces. This is not simply a question (significant though this is) of the sequencing of 
economic, political, and constitutional reforms; nor is it simply a question (equally significant) 
of the sequencing of various kinds of economic reforms. It is a question of the instability and 
disruption associated with a situation in which short-term economic and political survival rather 
than medium-term restructuring has been given priority. This is especially important because of 
the primacy of political factors in driving forward many of the changes which can be seen. 
If we assess the different pressures on the reform process stemming from foreign and 
domestic forces, regional restructuring is relatively weakly represented. The leading 
international institutions and organizations as well as many foreign governments have given 
higher priority to macro-economic stabilization, marketization and privatization, structural 
adjustment, and debt repayment. Regional strategies are associated more with the influence of 
foreign regional or local authorities and the interest of the European Union in promoting regional 
cooperation. Likewise, within individual ex-socialist states, regional restructuring is weakly 
developed because of the weakness of regional and local authorities in the old state socialist 
order. And concerns about these issues are overdetermined by ethnic, national, religious, and 
other tensions. This in turn inordinately complicates the process of regional economic planning. 
Thus as Pleskovic notes:  
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If Russia, Ukraine, and other republics are unable to balance their budgets or reduce deficits, 
and are unable to implement tight monetary policies, realistic exchange rates, and income 
policies, then hyperinflation will continue, making it extremely difficult, if not impossible, 
to implement effective regional development strategies and policies’ (Pleskovic 1993: 300). 
It follows from this that no single regional strategy is likely to become predominant. Instead 
there will be a large number of small-scale strategic initiatives which interact with an even larger 
number of more spontaneous developments rooted in market exchanges, foreign direct 
investment, and so forth. Regional economic strategies are most likely to develop on a local or 
regional scale through decentralized collaboration and joint undertakings in which border 
regions and/or economic affinities will play a key mediating role. The sheer multiplicity of these 
initiatives can be seen from a partial list provided by Neumann in relation to the Nordic-Baltic 
region - which some Danish experts envisage as a ‘blue banana’29 comparable to the 
developments in the curvilinear London-Milan growth region. Thus he notes that programmes 
for economic renewal include: a new Hanseatic League, a Baltic Sea Region, the Mare Balticum, 
a Euro-Baltic Region, a Scann-Baltic Political Space, an Ostseeraum, a severo-baltiyskiy poyas 
(i.e., Nordic-Baltic Belt comprising the Nordic states and the four Russian political entities of 
Murmansk, St Petersburg, Karelia, and Kaliningrad)30, and a Barents region centred on Norway 
and extending to the Arctic, Baltic, and North Seas (Neumann 1994: 67-8, 71). A similar 
profusion of projects exists for other regions within the European and Eurasian context. Whilst it 
is impossible for all of these to succeed, many are likely to attract political support and economic 
resources. It follows that the eventual regional configuration will be complex, tangled, and an 
evolutionary product. 
One of the factors influencing the subsequent (if still provisional) outcome of this evolution in 
the coming years will be the political learning curve for economic policy and the problems 
involved in consolidating various political regimes and strategies. After some four years of 
experimentation with economic and political reform in different countries and constantly 
changing circumstances, it would now seem that the most probable models of regional economic 
development would be as follows.  
First, adaptation of the initially predominant neo-liberal model in a social market direction 
(especially as German influence in Central Europe expands). Rather than leaving regional 
problems to solve themselves, there would be a stronger supply-side role for regional and/or 
local states; these would also operate in a selective neo-corporatist governance structure and so 
complement the more neo-liberal macro-economic stabilization and structural adjustment 
programmes pursued at the central level. This pattern will be most marked in Poland, the Czech 
lands, and Hungary, which were already most advanced in the movement to post-socialist market 
economies, and in the Baltic republics (additionally influenced by links to the social democratic 
economies in Scandinavia). These economies will form a second or third tier in the European 
economic hierarchy. Their respective capacities to sustain this development will be assisted in 
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this regard by the fact that they also seem to be most advanced, albeit not in identical fashion in 
all relevant regards, in the transition to some form of democratic regime31 (cf. Agh 1993). They 
are also in the most favoured position for integration into a wider European economic space due 
to their proximity to the heartland of the European Union and their privileged location on west-
east and north-south transportation and communication routes. 
Second, more authoritarian and/or national populist governments are likely to emerge in 
South Eastern Europe, the Ukraine, and Russia. This reflects greater political instability in these 
cases as well as the greater economic tasks involved in modernizing their economies. In this case 
one can expect to see tendencies towards medium-term protectionism, the resurrection of trading 
links with former Comecon members, and the development of trade with more peripheral 
economies in the Mediterranean and Black Sea regions. Rather than full integration into 
European economic space, one will see indirect linkages as these economies form a probable 
fourth tier in the European economic hierarchy. Such developments pose problems for pursuing 
regional economic strategies since the decentralization required by such strategies may well 
prove inconsistent with the political demands of maintaining authoritarian rule. Nonetheless the 
need for local or regional authorities to manage the social cohesion of the local or regional 
economies will leave some scope for initiative provided that there is a sufficient flow of inward 
investment and proposals for joint ventures to exploit any local competitive advantages.  
Third, whether or not an authoritarian pattern emerges in this context, we can also expect 
some regional development associated with peripheral export platforms. This will be linked to 
investments to exploit cheap labour and/or other resources for export in the short term and to 
take up forward positions in relation to any subsequent local development of domestic markets. 
Where this leads to an inflow of foreign currency, wages may rise and social services can be 
sustained. Export rents lead to segmentation. In this context there are already various proposals 
for ‘free economic zones’ and some are being developed. Fourth, parts of the former Soviet 
Union (including some Russian provinces) may become resource exporters comparable to 
Australia or Canada at earlier stages in their capitalist development. This would imply a major 
role for foreign (including Japanese as well as North American and European) as well as 
domestic capital (cf. Bremm 1993). It would also offer possibilities of regional enclave 
development around resource exports and/or resource processing. 
 
VIII. Concluding Remarks on Future Prospects 
 
Any concluding remarks about current trends, let alone future developments, are necessarily 
speculative. It is too early to evaluate present trends in the hope of adequately distinguishing 
long-term structural tendencies from short-term fluctuations, temporary reactions, conjunctural 
shifts, and the sheer chaos provoked by such a massive crisis. Skepticism is also prompted by the 
failure of various interwar proposals for regional federations (whether in the Balkan, Baltic, or 
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Danubian regions) due to divergent economic and/or political interests (cf. Arter 1993: 61-71); 
and by the checkered record of regional cooperation agreements among developing countries 
(ranging from free trade areas to economic communities) (cf. Langhammer 1992: 214-215). 
These difficulties in launching and consolidating new regional blocs reflect the complex 
cooperative-competitive-conflictual relations which are involved in any regional bloc - relations 
which will be no less evident in the post-socialist countries than elsewhere (cf. Tökès 1991: 
110). 
Even if one ignored worrying historical precedents, the costs of economic development in 
post-socialist societies are themselves very daunting. Thus, using 1989 capital stock as their base 
for calculations made in 1991, Collins and Rodrick estimated that an annual investment of USD 
420 billion for ten years would be required for Eastern Europe to catch up with average incomes 
in the European Community; the analogous figure for the whole of the former Soviet Union was 
USD 1.2 trillion per annum (Collins and Rodrick 1991). Only around USD 20 billion of Western 
capital has gone into the Eastern bloc since 1989. China received USD 26 billion in 1993 alone. 
Even if these vast sums could be raised in the West (at a time when South Africa as well as the 
Asian NICs are emerging as important alternative sites for investment), they exceed the 
absorptive capacities of many of the post-socialist economies. Resulting delays in convergence 
between post-socialist and capitalist countries will in turn delay effective continental economic 
integration - let alone political integration. At most there will be partial and/or patchy regional 
integration of the kinds discussed below. There is also continuing uncertainty about the 
economic, political, and social forces which will execute regional strategies and their relative 
position in the changing balance of forces in different regions. Given these current difficulties, it 
is even more problematic to predict future developments. For these also depend heavily on 
events beyond the borders of the post-socialist economies and on emerging relationships 
between these economies themselves. Moreover, as emphasized above, regional economic 
strategies are heavily politicized. Five broad speculations would nonetheless appear in order. 
First, a unified Germany will markedly extend its economic and political influence eastwards. 
Germany will be the key player and the epicentre in the regionalization of the East and Central 
European economies now that Comecon has collapsed and the old Soviet Union slowly 
disintegrates. This reflects not just its overall economic strength in Europe but also its role in 
trade and investment in the post-socialist economies. The probable result will be an extensive 
Deutschemark economic bloc which embraces at least Poland, the Baltic Republics, the Czech 
lands, Hungary, Slovenia, and Croatia. This reflects in part important economic and cultural 
links in historic Central Europe which could now be revived in the aftermath of communist 
collapse; in part, the current relative strengths and needs of the various economies involved;32 
and, in part, Germany’s interests in seeking new and rapidly expanding markets where triadic 
competition is less intense (cf. Szromnik 1992: 67). Moreover, to the west, this bloc will also 
include other European Economic Area members whose economies are closely integrated, or at 
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least convergent with, Germany. Among these one can mention the Netherlands, Luxemburg, 
Denmark, and, to the south, Austria and northern Italy. 
Second, German influence will be reinforced by three further continuing trends. These 
comprise: (a) the emergence of a Baltic economic region in which Germany and Sweden are the 
major advanced capitalist players (with Denmark and Finland also playing key roles) and in 
which northern Poland, the Baltic republics, and the western provinces of Russia are the main 
post-socialist members; (b) continued consolidation of the Visegrad cooperation agreement 
between Poland, Hungary, and the former Czechoslovakia; and (c) the extension of influence 
southwards through the Pentagonale, in which southern German Länder are already partially 
involved. These growing linkages within central Europe mark a shift from the pre-war period 
when, although Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia each had trading links to Germany, 
Austria and the Soviet Union, they engaged in little mutual trade among themselves (cf. Bakos 
1993). Poland will clearly play a key role in helping to mediate and consolidate this series of 
linkages, which will enable the Baltic and Adriatic regions to be closely linked into the European 
Economic Area. 
Third, further east still, we can also expect growing German and, more generally, Western 
European influence in the former Soviet Union. This will be associated both with competition 
against USA and Japanese influences and with strategic alliances or joint ventures involving 
partners from the other two triad regions as well as from the former Soviet republics. It will also 
be associated with the attempt by Russia to assert its traditional dominance in the Eurasian 
Continental geo-strategic realm. It is important to remember that, despite the collapse of the 
Soviet bloc and the partial disintegration of the CIS, Russia still massively outweighs the other 
CIS states. This suggests that the key terrains of economic and political contestation will be the 
western provinces of Russia, Belarus, and the Ukraine. For, despite their new-found 
independence as politically sovereign nations, these three republics still have important 
economic linkages and some form of conflictual cooperation is likely. Even within Russia itself, 
moreover, there are worries about the influence of Moscow. This helps account for the interest in 
the western provinces for seeking economic contacts with neighbouring non-Russian areas 
(Neumann 1994: 68). 
Fourth, the destiny of the rest of the Soviet Union is less clear. Whereas the most easterly 
provinces and republics may eventually be integrated into the Japanese (or even Chinese) 
economic orbit, the former Moslem Republics of the Soviet Union as well as the post-socialist 
states of Eastern Europe (notably Romania and Bulgaria) might well fall under the influence of 
Turkey (with possible US support on geo-strategic and military as well as economic grounds) as 
part of an emerging Black Sea economic community or Central Asian common market. Iran will 
also play a role in the latter regard but will seek to polarize the emerging regional economy 
around its interests. In this and other regards, of course, the Middle East remains an important 
‘shatterbelt’; in particular, the potential for conflict between moslem and orthodox parts of the 
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region is still strong. Although some observers have suggested that the USA might consolidate 
control over a ‘huge Moslem area’ (Graziani 1993: 255) including Turkey, the Moslem 
Republics, Iran, Saudi Arabia, etc., this is, to say the least, a problematic political project, given 
the volatility of the region. 
Fifth, the above developments could in turn provide the basis for the growth of a wider and 
greater Europe with the European Economic Area at its core. This would embrace the member 
states of the European Union, the new member states likely to accede in the next few years from 
Scandinavia, the Visegrad states, Austria, and the Balkan states, economies on the North African 
coast, and neighbouring middle eastern countries (cf. Perrone 1993: 1). This would be of interest 
to the European Union as competition with the North American and East Asian economic blocs 
intensifies. For the European Union economies would benefit from closer ties to the 
Mediterranean just as many economies in this region need European investment to overcome 

















1   In writing this paper I have benefitted from discussions with 
John Campbell, Paul Hare, Jerzy Hausner, Ivona Jackimova, 
Anatolij Kredisov, Klaus Nielsen, Claus Offe, Ioan Popa, Jean-
Yves Pôtel, Larry Ray, Ngai-Ling Sum, Lenny Zaiko, and Hans van 
Zon. The usual disclaimer applies. I have also benefitted from a 
grant from the EC under its ACE programme to study marketization 
and neo-liberal strategies in Europe. 
2   Even at the most abstract level of analysis, capital 
accumulation rests on a complementary but contradictory mix of 
commodity and non-commodity forms. Cf. Jessop 1990. 
3   But this collapse and the changes it entails are themselves 
modifying the impact of other changes (see below for more 
details). 
4   The republics could win political independence with relative 
ease because their right to secede was formally recognized in the 
Soviet constitution. 
5   Thus there are growing problems of regional sub-republican 
autonomy movements in the Sovereign Republic of Siberia, the Far 
East Republic, and Sakhalin (Mursaliev 1992); growing ethnic 
disputes between different national groups in several republics 
(cf. Brubaker 1994; Clark 1993); language issues in Central Asian 
states (cf. Glenn 1993). The first major outbreak of inter-ethnic 
strife occurred in 1988 when Muslim Azerbaizhanis and Christian 
Armenians conflicted in Transcaucasia. 
6   Only the Latvia-Estonia border is truly uncontested. 
7   The technological lag was greater in the Soviet Union than 
Central Europe, which was more closely integrated into the 
capitalist world economy; even here COCOM restrictions meant that 
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imported technology tended to be obsolete (cf. Enyedi 1992: 870). 
More generally, despite the crisis of Fordism in the European 
Community, the economic gap grew wider from the mid-1970s through 
to 1990. Thus, as Hamilton notes for 1985-90: ‘Western Europe 
achieved rapid growth of productivity in older sectors, 
significant restructuring into higher-technology activities and 
sophisticated services, while East-Central Europe generally 
failed to modernize or modify its outdated economic structure’ 
(Hamilton 1990: 153). 
8   This term is used by the Institute for Economic Planning for 
Peace to describe economic integration which depends less on 
cooperation among central authorities than on links between local 
and autonomous bodies in different countries (European Commission 
1992: 191). 
9   In this context structural competitiveness refers to the 
capacity of national economies to compete through the creation 
and retention of core economic competences with strong vertical 
and horizontal integration in a number of interrelated sectors 
together with the specific socio-political and cultural supports 
necessary for these always socially embedded, always socially 
regulated economic activities to occur and prosper. 
10   For some of the problems involved in such endeavours, see 
Langhammer 1992. 
11   The reference is to Benedict Anderson’s work on the nation as 
an ‘imagined’ community; the region is also an ‘imagined’ entity 
(see Anderson 1991). 
12   This situation is a remnant of the prewar period when East 
and Central European economies either comprised the periphery of 
a more developed core of European economy or, as in the case of 
Bohemia and Upper Silesia, were connected with the European core 
economies in western part of Europe. The exception is the 
location of raw materials processing plant in the east, close to 
sources in the Soviet Union. On these aspects see Van Zon 1992; 
Bachtler 1992. 
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13   For example, Russia has established the port city of 
Kaliningrad as the largest free enterprise zone in the world and 
it should serve as a gateway to the western provinces (cf. Feller 
1993). Free trade and/or free enterprise zones are also 
significant in the far eastern provinces. 
14   In terms of GDP per capita, Czechoslovakia and the DDR had 
attained the levels of Italy and Ireland in 1986; Bulgaria was on 
a par with Greece; Romania was ‘better off’ than the poorest EC 
country, Portugal; Hungary, Poland, and Yugoslavia were slightly 
‘worse off’ (Hamilton 1990: 153). 
15   These three post-socialist economies committed themselves to 
a gradual removal of trade barriers to EC exports over five years 
whilst the EC member states agreed a one-step liberalization of 
imports from the Visegrad three. 
16   We should note that Baldwin (1992) argued that an alliance 
between EFTA and the ex-CMEA economies would provide the former 
with additional leverage in negotiations over EU membership and 
the latter with the shortest route into the European Economic 
Area. 
17   PHARE is the acronym for Pologne Hongrie assistance à la 
reconstruction économique; the programme has since been extended 
to Bulgaria, the former Czechoslovakia, the former East Germany, 
and Romania. 
18   A typical Ouverture project is the Baltic gateways project. 
This grouped local authorities - Esbjerg in Denmark, Gdynia in 
Poland, Rostock in Germany, North Tyneside in UK, and, a late 
joiner, Klaipeda in Latvia - with a common interest in port 
development, industrial development, tourism, and the development 
of new Baltic links. 
19   Indeed Turkey hoped to become to the Asian republics what 
Germany was to Europe (cited in Gençkaya 1993: 551). 
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20   Indeed Nester concludes that it would make more sense for 
Japan to invest in Eastern and Central Europe, since this would 
provide an export platform to the European Community and to the 
former Soviet republics (1993: 732). 
21   These comprise: the Neisse Euroregion; the Elbe-Labe 
Euroregion; the Ertzgebirge Euroregion; and the Egrensis 
Euroregion. 
22   On the rediscovery of the value of the locality in the 1980s 
and its implications for relocalization in  Czechoslovakia, 
Bulgaria, the DDR, and, in particular, Poland and Hungary, see 
Maurel 1990: 216-17. 
23   In practise, however, substantive measures of redistribution, 
whether in industrial location decisions or attempts to equalize 
living conditions, were often counteracted by plan-induced 
disparities within and across regions. 
24   Owing to its enormous territorial scale and inherited inter- 
and intra-republican economic and social inequalities, this last 
problem is especially acute in the former Soviet Union. The 
former Baltic republics have the highest standard of living, 
followed by Slavic republics, then the Transcaucasian republics, 
and, finally, the central Asian-Moslem republics. 
25   On the fragmentation of local authorities in post-socialist 
conditions, see Enyedi 1992: 872. 
26   On the problems posed by population migration, see especially 
Pchelintsev 1993. 
27   Although Uzbekistan (20.3m) and Kazakhstan (16.7m) were more 
populous than Belarus they accounted for only 3.3 and 4.3 per 
cent of net output respectively. 
28   This can be contrasted with the Belarus case - where 
independence and CIS membership was the quickest route into the 
European Union; and the Russian case, where the CIS seemed the 
Page 35 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
best chance of maintaining the old Soviet Union (cf. Likhotal 
1992; Peterson 1992). 
29   The blue banana is so-called because of its shape (analogous 
to that of the ‘banana’ curving from the Home Counties around 
London through the Benelux countries, northern France, and 
central Germany, to northern Italy) and its axis around the 
Baltic sea. 
30   Note that the Nordic-Baltic Belt proposal excludes both 
Poland and the German Länder bordering the Baltic. 
31  In referring to democracy in this context, I refer to the 
normal form of capitalist political rule in the current phase of 
capitalist development. It should not be mistaken for non-
bourgeois democratic forms nor with earlier bourgeois forms (such 
as liberal parliamentary democracy). On the nature of the modern 
bourgeois state, see, inter alia: Poulantzas 1976 and 1978; and 
Jessop 1993. 
32   Thus Germany is specialized in the production of capital 
goods and machine tools useful in the modernization drive of 
post-socialist economies once inflation is brought under control 
and a modicum of economic stability is secured; and the post-
socialist economies can supply cheap consumer goods, agricultural 
products, and raw materials to Germany. 
